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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Mark

Charles Wilson appeals from the judgment 0f conviction entered upon the jury

verdict ﬁnding

Statement
In

him

Of The

—

March 2018,

And Course Of The Proceedings
in Custer County,

Brown

at their

Mark Wilson

11:25.)

called 911 and reported that he

Wilson did not provide a motive

go good today,” and “shit happens.” (State’s exhibit

3,

at that time,

— 3:12;

3:05

6:

wound t0 the back ofher head.

L.7.)

Brown was

still

alive,

(R., p.23; Tr.

1,

p.324, L.19

and a Life Flight helicopter was dispatched

L.8 — p.498, L.2.) At the subsequent jury

would describe Brown’s traumatic
p.430, L.3

p.348, L.15

—

trial,

injuries

— p.325,

L.6; p.340, L. 12

p.349, L.4.) Wilson

(Tr.,

p.437, L.21

— p.438,

that

L.22; p.495,

was implemented.

L.19.)

the porch 0f the residence With a beer in his hand.

was placed under
At

arrest

and transported

the police station,

the pretrial hearings, jury
1

trial,

(TL,

to the police station.

Wilson again admitting

Citations t0 the “Tr.” in this brief refer to the version 0f the transcript ﬁle that
all

local medical

to take her to the nearest hospital, but she died

and the attempted treatment

p.323, Ls.17-23; State’s Exhibits 14, 15.)

paginated and contains

— p.341,

the county coroner and the local clinic physician

— p.442, L.25; p.490, L.6 — p.503,

The ofﬁcers located Wilson 0n

1

but stated

but was coughing and had blood coming out 0f her mouth and the

from the gunshot wound before she could be transported.

(T12,

10

17-6235, 11:04

back ofher head. (TL, p.325, Ls.4-6; p.340, Ls.12-21.) Brown was transported t0 a

(T11,

0:

Ofﬁcers responded t0 the scene and found Brown lying in the basement With a single

bullet

clinic,

had just

residence With a .22 ﬁrearm. (R., p.23; State’s Exhibit 3,

1:40.) Despite the dispatcher’s questions,

that “it didn’t

—

guilty of ﬁrst—degree murder.

Facts

shot and killed Pat

trial

and sentencing hearing.

is

t0

continuously

shooting Brown,

—

15, 9:54

whom he
Wilson

10:21.)

and intoxicated.

stated

he had lived with for the previous three years. (State’s Exhibit

stated that

he had been arguing With Brown and was angry,

—

(State’s Exhibit 15, 10:21

11:14.)

He

later

explained that he and

frustrated,

Brown had

“started butting heads,” that he considered killing himself, that he “couldn’t handle” the

that they had,

and

that she said things that “pissed [him] off.”

(State’s Exhibit 16, 8:23

14:56 — 16:47.) In a follow-up interview, Wilson also stated that

Wilson told the ofﬁcer that
from

his next-door neighbor,

16, 11:27

—

—

12:37; T11, p.297, L.20

sell

that

some 0f

he borrowed the weapon he used t0

told that he

— p.304,

9:00,

his

8:21, 11:38- 12:02.)

earlier that day,

whom he

—

Brown was “nagging” him,

they were not getting along, and that he was frustrated about his attempts to
collected property. (State’s Exhibit 19, 7:54

argument

L.21.)

wanted

to “get rid

of a

cat.”

Wilson also acknowledged

kill

Brown

(State’s Exhibit

to the ofﬁcer that

he knew he was not lawfully permitted to possess a ﬁrearm because he was a convicted felon — a
fact that his

neighbor did not know. (State’s Exhibit 16, 11:39 — 11:53.)

In the follow-up interview conducted at the

he returned

home

went inside

his residence.

and placed
upstairs

the

it

(Exhibit 19, 3:33

bedroom door While he used
t0 the

that

When he

ﬁrst

—

Then he

4:22.)

left

it

in his truck

retrieved the

gun from the vehicle

— 4:32.). Then he placed the gun behind the

the bathroom. (Exhibit 19, 4:32

basement, where

Brown was.

(Exhibit 19,

5:

—

17

5:1 1.)

—

—

9:30.)

called 91

1.

—

retrieved

Wilson asserted
Instead,

a distance of approximately 15 feet. (Exhibit 19, 6:50

Approximately 10 minutes

(Exhibit 19, 12:49

Then he

5:35.)

he planned t0 shoot himself in front 0f Brown. (Exhibit 19, 5:40 — 6:15.)

Brown in the back of the head from
9:00

Wilson told the interviewing ofﬁcer

borrowing the gun from his neighbor, and

inside the front door. (Exhibit 19, 4:23

gun and went

that

after

jail,

13:04.)

later,

during which time

Brown was

still

alive,

he shot

—

7:51 ;

Wilson

The

state

charged Wilson with ﬁrst-degree murder and the sentencing enhancement for use

0f a ﬁrearm in the commission of a Violent crime.

(R., pp.45-46.)

Wilson waived

his right to a

preliminary hearing in consideration for the state declining t0 pursue the death penalty.

(E R.,

p.84.)

Before the
station in

(R.,

trial,

Wilson ﬁled a motion

to exclude a portion

0f his interview

at the

police

which he admitted that he was a convicted felon and could not lawfully possess a weapon.

pp.21 1-212.) The state ﬁled an I.R.E. 404(b) notice of intent and brief in support requesting

permission t0 introduce more detailed evidence of the underlying facts of the felony, Which
involved Wilson’s attempt to

Wilson conceded
t0 the

kill

another individual

that his status as a convicted felon

by breaking her neck.

who

(R., pp.58, 175-176.)

could not possess ﬁrearms was relevant

element 0f premeditation, but argued that the probative value 0f

this

outweighed by the danger 0f unfair prejudice pursuant t0 I.R.E. 403. (TL, p.1
L.8.) After considering

made during

argument from the

the police interview about his felony status

and malice aforethought (TL, p.1
introduce

parties, the district court ruled that

more

1 1,

L.9

—

p.1 13, L.4), but that

L.17; p.123, L.7

The jury was

2

Though the

— p.124,

instructed

over the state’s objection

manslaughter

it

t0

L.17 — p.1

1 1,

Wilson’s statement

prove premeditation

would not permit

the state t0

detailed evidence about the underlying facts of the felony offense unless the

defense opened the door t0 that evidence during the

— p.1 19,

was admissible

10,

evidence was

(T12,

(R., pp.247-254).

state

trial (Tr., p.1 13,

L.7 — p.1 15, L. 1 5; p.1 18, Ls.6

L.10.).2

0n the elements of ﬁrst-degree murder, second-degree murder, and,
p.538, L.16

—

p.539,

L25; p.545, L23 — p.546,

At the conclusion 0fthe trial,

the jury found

attempted to raise the issue again during the

trial (Tr.,

L.1

1),

voluntary

Wilson guilty 0f ﬁrst-

p.540, L.23

— p.548,

L.2),

the district court never did ultimately permit the state to introduce evidence 0f the circumstances

underlying Wilson’s felony conviction.

degree murder and the sentencing enhancement. (R., pp.276-277.) The

uniﬁed

life

sentence With 30 years

for the enhancement.

Tr.), the court

(R.,

ﬁxed

pp.286-290;

for ﬁrst—degree murder, With

Tr.,

p.697, L.11

— p.698,

district court

ﬁve

additional

imposed a

ﬁxed years

L.7.) After a hearing (1 1/18/19

denied Wilson’s subsequent I.C.R. 35(b) motion for reduction of sentence (R.,

pp.301-302, 313-3 14). Wilson timely appealed. (R., pp.294-296.)

ISSUES
Wilson
I.

II.

states the issues

0n appeal

as:

Did the district court abuse its
Wilson was a convicted felon?

discretion

by admitting evidence

that

Mr.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence
0n Mr. Wilson and by denying his motion for a more lenient sentence?

(Appellant’s brief, p.4)

The
1.

state rephrases the issues

on appeal

as:

Has Wilson failed t0 show that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
to exclude evidence that he was a convicted felon who could not lawfully possess a
ﬁrearm?

2.

Has Wilson

failed to

show

that the district court

imposed an excessive sentence

for ﬁrst-

degree murder?

3.

Has Wilson

failed to

show that the

district court

35(b) motion for reduction 0f sentence?

abused

its

discretion

by denying his

I.C.R.

ARGUMENT
I.

Wilson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion BV Denying His
Motion To Exclude Evidence That He Was A Convicted Felon Who Could Not LawfullV
Possess

A.

A Firearm

Introduction

Wilson contends

that the district court

abused

exclude evidence that he was a convicted felon
(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-18.)

within

its

its

who

discretion

by denying

his

motion

to

could not lawfully possess a ﬁrearm.

However, a review of the record reveals

that the court acted well

discretion in concluding that the probative value 0f the evidence With respect t0 the

malice aforethought and premeditation elements was not substantially outweighed by the danger

0f unfair prejudice.

B.

Standard

Of Review

“This Court reviews challenges t0 a
discretion standard.” Perry

V.

trial

court’s evidentiary rulings under the abuse 0f

Magic Valley Reg’l Med.

Ctr.,

134 Idaho 46, 50, 995 P.2d 816, 820

(2000). “Trial courts maintain broad discretion in admitting and excluding evidence.”

State V.

Weigle, 165 Idaho 482, 487, 447 P.3d 930, 935 (2019).

C.

The

District

Court Acted Well Within

Evidence must be relevant
has “any tendency” t0
probable.

’7

I.R.E. 401.

make

t0

Its

Discretion

be admissible

at trial.

To Exclude The Challenged Evidence
I.R.E. 402.

Evidence

99
a fact “of consequence in determining the action,

“Whether a

fact is ‘of

relationship to the legal theories presented

by

consequence’ or material

the parties.”

462 P.3d 1125, 1134 (2019). Relevant evidence may

still

is

is

(6

relevant if it

more or

determined by

State V. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661,

be excluded “if

its

less

its

_,

probative value

is

substantially outweighed

by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the

the jury, or by considerations

evidence.”

I.R.E. 403.

if

it is

express

and

is

“when

implied

show

that

there

When

not admissible to prove a

he acted in conformity therewith, but such evidence

may

is

was properly instructed that “malice,” a necessary element of murder,

a manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to

“[t]he killing resulted

the act are dangerous t0

from an intentional

human life,” and “[t]he act was

the danger t0, and with conscious disregard for,

that the

is

relevant for other purposes. I.R.E. 404(b).

In this case, the jury

is

delay, waste 0ftime, 0r needless presentation 0f cumulative

Evidence 0f other crimes, wrongs, 0r acts

person’s character in order t0

be admitted

ofundue

issues, or misleading

99
murder requirement of “aforethought

than follow the act.”

The jury was

a

act,” “[t]he natural

human

(R., p.248.)

being,”

consequence 0f

deliberately performed With

human life.”
(6

kill

knowledge of

The jury was

instructed

only means that the malice must precede rather

(Id.)

also properly instructed the following with respect t0 premeditation, a

necessary element 0f ﬁrst-degree murder:
Premeditation means to consider beforehand whether to kill or not to kill,
and then t0 decide t0 kill. There does not have t0 be any appreciable period of time
during which the decision to kill was considered, as long as it was reﬂected upon
before the decision was made. A mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even though
it includes an intent to kill, is not premeditation[.]
(R., p.249.)

Before the
station in

(R.,

trial,

Wilson ﬁled a motion

to exclude a portion

0f his interview

at the

police

which he admitted that he was a convicted felon and could not lawfully possess a weapon.

pp.21 1-212.) At a hearing on the motion, Wilson expressly conceded that this evidence was

relevant to the element of premeditation, but argued that the probative value of the evidence

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice pursuant to I.R.E. 403.

(Tr., p.1 10,

was

L.17 — p.1

1 1,

L.8.)

After considering argument from the parties, the district court ruled that the evidence

admissible t0 prove premeditation and malice aforethought.

(Tr., p.1

was

L.9 — p.1 13, L.4). The

1 1,

court reasoned:

I

think the state’s argument

a compelling argument, that they’re entitled

is

and they’re entitled to present their theory of the case of Why
this was premediated, and the malice aforethought involved. And so I think that
the defendant’s state of mind and how he -- what he did in leading up t0 this
incident, how he came in possession 0f a ﬁrearm and the circumstances, and his
state of mind, knowing that he was ineligible t0 have a ﬁrearm but yet still Willing
to go to those -- go t0 whatever lengths to obtain possession 0f a ﬁrearm is relevant.
to present their case,

And

I think that relevance outweighs any
he had a prior felony conviction. There’s no

to the issues in this case,

prejudicial impact ofjust the fact that

reference to What that prior felony conviction was.

(TL, p.1

1 1,

L.14 — p.1 12, L6.) The

district court

acted well within

its

discretion in

making

this

determination.

First, the state

notes that the relevance of this type 0f evidence utilized for the purpose of

proving malice aforethought and premeditation
precedent identiﬁed by Wilson or the

state.

district court

had t0 evaluate the evidence

that the state

was required

to

It

was

not established or precluded by any controlling
thus truly a discretionary decision in Which the

in light ofthe circumstances

prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The

therefore entitled to substantial deference in

issue

is

was thoroughly argued by the

parties

making

0f this case and the elements

state

submits that the court

this determination, particularly

and considered by the

district court,

is

Where the

Which was

clearly

aware of its discretionary authority and the boundaries of that authority as provided by the relevant
rules.

for

ﬂ

State V.

Nava, 166 Idaho 884,

an abuse of discretion results in

As Wilson

this

_, 465 P.3d 1123, 1127 (2020) (“The standard ofreview
Court giving deference to the

properly conceded, the evidence was relevant.

trial

court”).

Knowing

that

he was not

lawﬁllly permitted t0 possess a ﬁrearm, and his Willingness t0 acquire one anyway, increased the

likelihood that Wilson sought the

ﬁrearm

for a signiﬁcant

lawﬁllly possessed a ﬁrearm, his acquisition of one

own mindset and the

have

t0 the contrary, less suspicious With

circumstances surrounding their commission of a murder. That

Wilson knowingly committed a felony
shot

would be,

If he could

Premeditation and malice aforethought depend entirely on the

respect to his intentions.

defendant’s

and improper purpose.

Brown with the weapon,

is

t0 obtain the

murder weapon,

just a short time before he

thus relevant t0 that mindset and those circumstances.

Further, as the district court noted in conducting the relevant balancing test,3 the danger 0f

unfair prejudice

was, 0r

how

was

limited.

long ago

it

The jury was not informed What Wilson’s

occurred.

(m State’s Exhibit

statement about his status as a felon
interview that

The

was admitted

district court’s

16, 11:39

came up only brieﬂy

into evidence.

(E

—

prior felony conviction

11:53.)

in the context

Further, Wilson’s

of a lengthier police

id.)

corresponding I.R.E 404(b) ruling further

illustrates that

it

thoughtfully

considered the evidence and placed a reasonable line of admissibility that conformed with the

Idaho

rules.

While the court permitted the brief mention of Wilson’s felony

lawfully possess ﬁrearms, the court struck

down

—

p.1 19, L.17; p.123, L.7

evidence, but instead carefully considered

acted well within

3

its

— p.124,
its

and

inability t0

the state’s attempt to delve further into the

circumstances surrounding that felony conviction in
L.15; p.1 18, Ls.6

status

its

case-in-chief.

L.10.)

(TL, p.1 13, L.7

—

p.1 15,

The court did not rubber-stamp

this

admissibility under the relevant Idaho rules, and

discretion in doing so.

more than it was required t0 in order to admit the evidence
The court found that the probative value 0f the evidence afﬁrmatively
“outweigh[ed] any prejudicial impact” of the evidence (TL, p.1 12, Ls.2-4), where I.R.E. 403 only
In fact, the district court found

pursuant to I.R.E. 403.

required the probative value of the evidence not to be “substantially outweighed”
unfair prejudice in order to be admissible.

by

a danger of

On

appeal,

Wilson

asserts that the

danger of unfair prejudice was increased by the lack 0f

a “proper limiting instruction” clarifying that the jury could only consider the evidence for a
limited purpose and not for propensity. (Appellant’s brief, p. 1 7.) However, Wilson did not request

(E R.,

such an instruction.

pp.167-168.)

required t0 give a limiting instruction

“Pursuant to I.R.E. 105, the

when

a party requests such an instruction.”

Osterhoudt, 155 Idaho 867, 876, 318 P.3d 636, 645 (Ct. App. 2013).
that the district court

It

m

district court is

only

was not error, 0r surprising,

would decline t0 utilize a sua sponte limiting instruction regarding challenged

evidence that Wilson likely did not want t0 draw too

Wilson also contends

much

attention to.

that the district court erroneously admitted the challenged evidence

pursuant t0 I.R.E. 609. (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-12.) Idaho Rule of Evidence 609 provides that a
party

may impeach

requirements are met
case, occurred

I.R.E.

609

The court

in

a witness’s credibility With evidence 0f a prior conviction if certain

— requirements Which become

more than 10 years

its

ago.

As Wilson

stricter if the prior conviction, like that in this

correctly notes, the district court mentioned

analysis ofthe challenged evidence in this case.

stated:

However,

it

“I’m familiar With Rule 403, 404(b), as well as 609, as

proving character for truthfulness, based on prior convictions,” (TL, p.1
that the application

of Rule 403 and 404(b), as well as considering 609

used speciﬁcally as impeachment,

it

is

did so only in passing.

far as

1 1,

--

how

it

relates t0

Ls.9-13) and “I think

although

it’s

reputation for truthfulness in this context.

not being

The court

considers that rule in this context as well.” (Tr., p.1 12, Ls.15-21.)

The
in this case.

state

submits that the

Because

it

was

district court’s

relevant,

passing references t0 I.R.E. 609 are a red herring

Wilson “bore the burden

to

oppose the evidence and provide

a basis for exclusion.” State V. Hayes, 166 Idaho 646, 462 P.3d 1110, 1120 (2020).
application of Rule 609

is

irrelevant to

whether Wilson met that burden.

10

Li.

Any erroneous

The court admitted

the challenged evidence because

purpose, and because the probative value 0f the evidence

danger 0f unfair prejudice.

It

did not admit

and the evidence was never used for
Further, before the court

made

its

that

it

as

evidence for impeachment, and that

its

was not

was

relevant for a permissible

substantially

outweighed by the

impeachment evidence pursuant

purpose

ruling, the state

it

which Wilson did not

at the trial, at

made

clear that

was

position

t0 I.R.E. 609,

it

was not seeking

testify.

t0 utilize the

that the evidence did not satisfy the

requirements of I.R.E. 609. (TL, p.101, Ls.18-23; p.104, Ls.13-20; p.106, Ls.12-24.) At worse,
the court’s stray references to I.R.E.

Wilson has

609 were harmless.

failed to demonstrate that the district court

the challenged evidence. This Court should therefore

abused

its

discretion

afﬁrm Wilson’s conviction

by admitting

for ﬁrst-degree

murder.

D.

Any Error Was Harmless
Even

admitting the challenged evidence, this error was

if the district court erred in

harmless. “‘A defendant appealing from an objected-to, non-constitutionally-based error shall

have the duty t0 establish that such an error occurred,
of demonstrating that the error

is

at

Which point the

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State

163 Idaho 40, 46, 408 P.3d 38, 44 (2017) (quoting State
961, 974 (2010)).

“‘[T]he error

is

harmless

without the error.”‘ Li. (quoting State

ﬂ alﬂ
standard,

Garcia, 166 Idaho at

State shall

V.

if the

V. Perry,

there

was

V.

Montgomery,

150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d

Court ﬁnds that the result would be the same

Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598, 301 P.3d 242, 256 (2013));

_, 462 P.3d

at

1137-1139 (clarifying the Idaho harmless error

Which requires a consideration 0f the “probative force” of the

Here,

have the burden

overwhelming

evidence

0f Wilson’s

error).

malice

aforethought

and

premeditation even absent the challenged evidence. Most speciﬁcally, these elements were proven

11

by the manner in which Wilson acquired the ﬁrearm and repeatedly concealed
he borrowed the ﬁrearm from a neighbor, and then concealed
before the

it

p.342, L.16

described at the

trial (Tr.,

steps t0 load the

ﬁrearm before

the shooting

that

—

three times in the short period

killing

—

Additionally, as one of the responding ofﬁcers

p.344, L.1), Wilson also

Brown—putting

the

was

12:02.)

(State’s Exhibit 16, 8:29

Finally, aside

was admitted

—

9:15, 14:56

—

in the

earlier in the

was not referenced again by

during the opening statements and closing arguments.

to ofﬁcers that

day and

16:47; Exhibit 19, 7:51

from the brief mention of Wilson’s felony

into evidence, this fact

t0 take several

gun and pulling back

Wilson indicated

which had occurred

the cumulation 0f an argument

frustrated.

would have had

magazine

the ejection lever t0 feed a live round into the chamber. Further,

11:38

above,

murder—once in the vehicle When he ﬁrst entered the house, once behind the front door,

and once behind the upstairs bedroom door.

angry and

As noted

it.

—

him

8:21;

status in the interview

either

(E generally Tr.)

left

party—including

In light of this evidence

and these circumstances, the jury thus would have found the same verdict regardless of whether
the challenged evidence

was admitted.

II.

Wilson Has Failed To Show That The

A.

Court Imposed
Deggee Murder

District

An Excessive

Sentence For

First-

Introduction

Wilson contends

that the district court

abused

its

discretion and

imposed an excessive

sentence for ﬁrst—degree murder. (Appellant’s brief, pp.18-29.) However, a review 0f the record

impose a uniﬁed

sentence with

reveals that the district court acted well within

its

30 years ﬁxed for ﬁrst—degree murder in

of the nature of Wilson’s crime, the severe danger

light

discretion to

life

he poses t0 the community, and the sentence’s reasonableness compared t0 other ﬁrst-degree

murder sentences identiﬁed by the

state.

12

Standard

B.

Of Review

When a sentence is Within statutory limits, the appellate court will review only for an abuse
of discretion. State

V.

Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).

the burden of demonstrating that the sentencing court abused

The

C.

District

T0 bear

Court Acted Well Within

Its

its

The appellant has

discretion. Li.

Sentencing Discretion

the burden of demonstrating an abuse of sentencing discretion, an appellant

challenging his sentence must establish that, under any reasonable View 0f the facts, the sentence

is

excessive.

I_d.

To

establish that his sentence

is

excessive,

Wilson must demonstrate

that

reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate t0 accomplish the sentencing
goals ofprotecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. Li; see also State V. Toohill,

103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982) (setting forth these sentencing objectives).

“When

considering Whether the district court abused

courts] review the entire sentence[.]”

its

sentencing discretion, [the appellate

State V. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895,

392 P.3d 1228, 1236

(2017) (citation omitted). However, the appellate court will “presume that the defendant’s term of

conﬁnement

Will probably

be the ﬁxed portion 0f the sentence, because Whether or not the

defendant’s incarceration extends beyond the

ﬁxed portion of the sentence

Will

be Within the sole

discretion of the parole board.” Li. (citation omitted).

In this case, the state

Ls.23-25.)

recommended a uniﬁed life sentence with 50

years ﬁxed. (T12, p.675,

Wilson did not provide a speciﬁc sentencing recommendation, but

understood that under Idaho law, “this court’s judgment has t0 be
p.677, Ls. 10-13.) After stating that

it

at least

stated that

he

ten [years ﬁxed].” (TL,

had careﬁllly considered the relevant sentencing materials

and the appropriate sentencing factors noted above (TL, p.683, Ls.12-18; p.687, Ls.1

13

1-17), the

district court

imposed a uniﬁed

life

sentence with thirty years

ﬁxed

(Tr.,

p.697, L.11

— p.698,

L.7).

A review 0f the record supports the district court’s sentencing determination.
The nature 0f Wilson’s crime justiﬁed
without any provocation, Wilson murdered a

With premeditation, and

the sentence imposed.

woman who had

shared her

home and

ﬁnancially

supported him, and then waited 10 minutes t0 call the police While she laid dying on the ﬂoor.

Wilson’s murder appears to have been based upon an accumulation 0f

disagreements he had with Brown. (Conf. Exhibits, p.3 1; State’s Exhibit 15, 10:21
Exhibit 16, 8:29

to

— 9:15, 14:56 —

16:47; State’s Exhibit 19, 7:54

— 8:21,

and petty

life stresses

—

1 1

11:38- 12:02.)

:

14; State’s

It is

imagine a more brutal crime, or a crime where a lengthy ﬁxed prison sentence

appropriate than

As

it is

the district court properly recognized (TL, p.687, L.11

0f this case,

is

more

in this case.

Wilson poses a serious
facts

difﬁcult

threat t0 the safety

this is

most

— p.688, L.19; p.692,

Ls.5-13),

of any community in which he resides. Aside from the

clearly indicated

by his

prior criminal history. In 2005,

Wilson was

convicted ofbattery with intent t0 commit a serious felony. (Conf. Exhibits, p.32.) In that incident,

Wilson admitted

became “pissed

t0 ofﬁcers that

off”

due

he

tried t0 kill his sister—in-law

to her interfering

However, Wilson explained,

his Victim’s

as occurred “in the movies.” (R., p. 1 80.)

with his

Visits

neck did not “snap

Wilson

is

Willing t0 kill

when

faced With

stress.

with his brother.
easily,” as

(Id.)

(R.,

he expected

further told the ofﬁcer,

he wished he had been successful in killing his sister-in-law.
he

by breaking her neck

even

after

he

pp.179-180.)

it

would, and

after his arrest, that

Wilson has demonstrated

Wilson also has prior convictions

for driving

that

under

the inﬂuence and criminal sexual conduct. (Conf. Exhibits, pp.31-32.)

The psychological evaluator found that Wilson meets the

criteria for Intermittent

Explosive

Disorder, which involves repeated, sudden episodes of impulsive, aggressive, Violent behavior 0r

14

angry verbal outbursts in which an individual reacts grossly out of proportion t0 the

The evaluator noted

(Conf. Exhibits, pp.1 12-1 13.)

When he has been drinking

greatest

is

life.

(Conf. Exhibits, p.1 13.) Wilson’s

LSI-R score placed

in the high-risk recidivism category. (Conf. Exhibits, p.39.)

The murder appeared

to

both Wilson and

Brown

16, 9:20

stated that

he and

— 9:30), one ofthe responding ofﬁcers who knew

testiﬁed that they “were in a relationship of sorts” and “acted like a

couple.” (TL, p.379, Ls.5-16.)
that

While Wilson

have a domestic component.

Brown were “just good friends” (Exhibit

and

Wilson’s future risk of assault

alcohol t0 excess, and observed that Wilson has struggled With alcohol

dependence the majority of his adult

him

that

situation.

He

also believed

Brown was

the “breadwinner” in the relationship

Wilson performed only odd jobs and was dependent on Brown. (TL, p.379, L.22 — p.380,

L8; p.3 8 1

Ls.9- 1 6.)

,

At the sentencing hearing, Brown’s neighbor testiﬁed that Brown and Wilson

were romantically involved, and discussed how Brown “would chuckle about her being the
cougar” due to the age difference between her and Wilson.

During the follow-up interview

Ls.4-17.)

movement 0f the gun
19, 5:00

—

at the jail,

prior to the murder, that he and

(Tr.,

p.651, L.19

— p.652,

L.2; p.656,

Wilson mentioned, When discussing

Brown

his

shared a bedroom. (State’s Exhibit

5:15.)

During the presentation of its sentence recommendation, the

from which

to

state offered a tangible metric

identify the range of an appropriate sentence—sentences other ﬁrst-degree

murderers have received in recent years in Idaho.

An individual contacted by the prosecutor at the

Idaho Department of Corrections found three ﬁrst-degree murder sentences imposed upon
individuals

One

Who murdered

received a

life

their wife or girlfriend since 2012.

(TL, p.665, L.11

— p.666,

sentence without the possibility of parole, one received a uniﬁed

With 37 years ﬁxed, and one received a uniﬁed

life

15

life

L.13.)

sentence

sentence with 25 years ﬁxed. (Tr., p.666, L. 14

—

The IDOC ofﬁcial found

p.667, L.4.)

domestic component.
sentence With

p.667, Ls.5-23.)

ﬁxed terms between 25 and 35

the range established

On

(Tr.,

three other ﬁrst-degree

by these

cases,

that

had a

Each of these defendants received a uniﬁed

years. (Id.)

The

district court’s

sentence

life

was Within

and was clearly not excessive under the circumstances.

Wilson takes issue With the

appeal,

murder sentences

district court’s observation,

made during

the

sentencing hearing, that Wilson previously had opportunities for treatment and rehabilitation
associated with his prior Violent criminal conviction. (Appellant’s brief, pp.24-26 (citing Tr.,

p.690, L.16

-

p.691, L.6; Tr., p.695, L.23

-

p.696, L.2).)

Wilson argues

disregarded the possibility of rehabilitation entirely, and that, in

fact,

that the court thus

Wilson previously received

insufﬁcient mental health treatment. (Id.) However, a review of the context of these portions of
the sentencing transcript reveals that the court in

treatment, and in fact, recognized that

p.695, Ls.15-22.)

also

Wilson can continue

The court simply noted,

the past. If Wilson

n0 way disregarded the

correctly, that

possibility 0f further

t0 receive treatment in prison.

Wilson had obtained some treatment

had never received treatment for his alcohol and mental health

would have been

(TL,
in

issues, then this

relevant t0 the district court’s sentencing determination.

Whatever

insufﬁciencies existed in Wilson’s prior treatment opportunities did not require a lesser sentence

for ﬁrst-degree murder.

Wilson also discusses Cook

V. State,

145 Idaho 482, 489, 180 P.3d 521, 528 (Ct. App.

2008), in which the Idaho Court of Appeals vacated a 29-year

imposed upon a

man,

in part, because “to incarcerate

ﬁxed sentence which had been

Cook for,

at

determinate twenty—nine years would be nearly the equivalent 0f imposing a
the relatively advanced age

eligible for parole.”

Cook

will

a

minimum,

life

the ﬁlll

sentence given

have reached in a prison setting by the time he

is

even

(Appellant’s brief, p.28.) Such a sentence, the Court of Appeals explained,
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“essentially discounts

any possibility of rehabilitation and successful reentry

into society.”

(Id.

(quoting Co_ok, 145 Idaho at 489, 180 P.3d at 528)). Wilson argues that likewise, in his case, there

is

man (Conf.

a reduced need t0 force the prison system t0 detain a

Exhibits, p.27), for

30 years when rehabilitative treatment could be provided in the ﬁrst 10 years,
age would have decreased the risk of recidivism.
distinguishable.

at

Cook was

485, 180 P.3d at 524.

at

(Appellant’s brief, p.27.)

convicted 0f nine counts of grand theft by deception.

which point

m
m,

is

his

easily

145 Idaho

Obviously, a ﬁrst—degree murder conviction creates more compelling

concerns for the safety of the community. Further, in Co_ok, the Court of Appeals found that the
district court

which

is

abused

its

discretion

for eight 0f the counts consecutively—

not an issue in the present case. Li. at 490, 180 P.3d at 529. Finally, the fact that Wilson

committed ﬁrst-degree murder

from

by running the sentences

at

a relatively advanced age, and had escalated his Violent behavior

his previous felony conviction years earlier, indicates that his future recidivism risk is likely

far greater than

A

an individual

who commits

a Violent crime at a younger age.

review of the record and a consideration of the facts of

this case

and Wilson’s prior

criminal history supports the district court’s sentencing determination. Wilson has therefore failed
to demonstrate that the district court

abused

its

sentencing discretion.

III.

Wilson Has Failed T0 Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
I.C.R. 35(b) Motion For Reduction Of Sentence
A.

BV Denying His

Introduction

Wilson contends

that the district court

motion for reduction 0f sentence. (Appellant’s
reveals that the district court acted well within

abused

its

discretion

brief, pp.29-34.)

its

17

discretion to

by denying

his I.C.R. 35(b)

However, a review 0f the record

deny Wilson’s motion.

B.

Standard

Of Review

If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a

Rule 35

is

a plea for leniency, and the Court reviews the denial 0f the motion for an abuse of

discretion. State V.

Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal,

Wilson must “show

that the sentence is excessive in light

subsequently provided t0 the

C.

motion for reduction of sentence under

district court in

of

new

or additional information

support 0f the Rule 35 motion.”

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion To Deny Wilson’s
Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b) permits the

district court to,

I_d.

I.C.R. 35(b)

upon motion from

Motion

the defendant,

reduce a sentence Within 120 days of the entry ofjudgment imposing sentence.

Wilson supported
L22.) Exhibit

A was

12.)

show

trial

motion With four

exhibits. (1 1/18/19

TL,

p.5, L.5

— p.6,

an undated bid from “Mark[‘s] Maintenance Service” to provide cleaning

services for Wells Fargo.

from the

his I.C.R. 35(b)

(Exhibits, p.53.)

This exhibit was submitted in response t0 testimony

and sentencing hearing about What Wilson did for work.

Exhibits B, C, and

D were

the relationship between

simple greeting cards given by

Wilson and Brown.

(1

Brown

(1

t0

1/18/19 Tr., p.5, Ls.9-

Wilson, purportedly to

1/18/19 Tr., p.6, Ls.16-22; Exhibits, pp.47-

52.)

The court properly denied

the motion.

The submitted exhibited provided no reason

reduce Wilson’s sentence for ﬁrst—degree murder. The fact that Wilson submitted
t0 provide cleaning services

was

at least

t0

one bid

consistent With trial and sentencing testimony that he occasionally

cleaned out houses for real estate companies. (TL, p.316, Ls.9-19; p.659, Ls.4-9.) This does not
contradict other evidence that

Wilson did not maintain

stable

dependent 0n Brown. The mitigating impact 0f the greeting cards
to explain

it

below or on appeal.

employment and was
is

unclear—Wilson did not

If anything, the cards further illustrate
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largely

how Wilson

try

callously

murdered a person who cared
appropriate initially,

On

appeal,

hearing that

“it’s

it

was

him and supported him. For

for

certainly

Wilson assigns

still

all

the reasons the sentence

was

appropriate in light of these unpersuasive exhibits.

error to a statement

by

not required to consider the Exhibits

the district court at the I.C.R. 35(b)

A

through

D

that

were submitted.”

(Appellant’s brief, pp.29-31 (citing 11/18/19 Tr., p.16, Ls.1-3).) However, Viewed in context,

is

apparent that the court meant that

the exhibits.

state.

The court admitted

(11/18/19 T11, p.5, L.23

Exhibit A, that

it

“Will consider

(11/18/19 Tr., p.6, Ls.1 1-13.)
exhibits.

(1

all

-

it

was exercising

discretion to place

little

or n0 weight

on

four of the exhibits into evidence, over the objections of the

p.7, L.14.)

it,

its

it

The court

also speciﬁcally stated, With respect t0

and place whatever weight on

The court

also stated that

it

it I

feel

should be placed 0n

had reviewed

all

it.”

of the submitted

Thus, the record indicates that the court reviewed and

1/19/19 T11, p.7, Ls.12-14.)

considered the exhibits, and gave them the weight they were entitled—little or none.

Wilson next highlights the

district court’s

statement that

it

knew Wilson had recently been

sentenced in another case, and that the court in that case imposed a sentence to run consecutive t0
the ﬁrst-degree

murder sentence imposed

11/19/19 Tr., p.19, Ls.17-23; p.19, L.24
sentence,

it

would be

in the present case. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3 1-32 (citing

— p.20,

“basically nullifying

L.4.).)

The court noted

what the judge

in that case felt

[Wilson’s] conviction in that case.” (1 1/19/19 TL, p.19, L.24
authority that this

is

—

p.20, L.4.)

reduced Wilson’s

was appropriate on
Wilson has

cited

an improper consideration in ruling upon an I.C.R. 35(b) motion.

event, the state submits that the district court

collateral

that ifit

was simply acknowledging another

consequence 0f a sentence reduction, and that there

is

no indication

19

any

potential

in the record that

this observation actually factored into the court’s ruling, particularly considering the

nature of the submitted exhibits as noted above.

In

n0

unpersuasive

Finally,

Wilson

asserts

that the

court abused

district

its

discretion

by purportedly

considering his request to reduce the ﬁxed term of his sentence to 10 years as an “all 0r nothing”
proposition

When it

really accomplish

stated that “[e]ven if I reduced your sentence to

what you were hoping

(citing 11/19/19 Tr., p.20, Ls.17-21).)

0f the

district court’s

t0

25 years ﬁxed, that would not

accomplish here today.” (Appellant’s

Once

again, the state submits that

pp.32-33

brief,

Wilson makes too much

improvised hearing observations. The court did not indicate that

it

would

reduce Wilson’s sentence by some lesser amount if not for his request that the sentence be reduced

more

dramatically. Instead, the court thoughtfully

the sentence

did (1 1/19/19 Tr., p.16, L.5

it

—

summarized its reasons

for originally

imposing

p.19, L.16), and then stated that even reducing the

sentence t0 25 years, which would be the “most

I

would have ever been willing

t0 do,”

would not

“send[] the correct message under the circumstances,” and that “I’m just not feeling that that’s

even justiﬁed”
district court

Even

(1

abused
if

was harmless

its

discretion.

any of the

district court’s

challenged statements constituted error, any such error

in light of the context noted above,

Wilson submitted

The

1/19/19 Tr., p.20, Ls.9-24). Wilson has therefore failed t0 demonstrate that the

at the hearing.

district court

and the unpersuasive nature of the exhibits

The denial 0f Wilson’s

did not abuse

its

discretion

I.C.R. 35(b)

motion was

by denying Wilson’s

inevitable.

I.C.R. 35(b)

motion

to

reduce his sentence under the circumstances of this case. This Court must therefore afﬁrm the
district court’s

order denying Wilson’s motion.
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CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court t0 afﬁrm Wilson’s judgment 0f conviction for

ﬁrst-degree murder.

DATED this 3 1st day of December,

2020.

/s/

Mark W. Olson
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